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Abstract: 
This paper develops a respondent model of Bayesian updating for a double-bound dichotomous 
choice (DB-DC) contingent valuation methodology.  We demonstrate by way of data simulations 
that current DB-DC identifications of true willingness-to-pay (WTP) may often fail given this 
respondent Bayesian updating context.  Further simulations demonstrate that a simple extension 
of current DB-DC identifications derived explicitly from our Bayesian updating behavioral 
model can correct for much of the WTP bias.  Additional results provide some caution to 
viewing respondents as acting strategically toward the second bid.  Finally, an empirical 
application confirms the simulation outcomes. 
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I. Introduction 
The implementation by researchers of a double-bound dichotomous choice (DB-DC) 
contingent valuation methodology (CVM) over a single-bound dichotomous choice (SB-DC) 
CVM suggests incentive incompatible respondent behavior, which leads to biased (typically 
downward) willingness-to-pay (WTP) estimates (Carson, et al., 2000).  Various specifications 
exist for researchers to attempt to identify respondent true WTP by accounting for this apparent 
shift of respondents’ latent true WTP between responses to the first and second bid amounts, 
including models of structural shift (Alberini et al., 1997) and starting-point bias (Herriges and 
Shogren, 1996).  This paper develops a respondent model of Bayesian updating for a DB-DC 
CVM that is used to demonstrate how existing identifications of unbiased respondent WTP may 
often fail.  However, we also show that a simple extension of the structural shift model, which is 
derived explicitly from our Bayesian updating behavioral model, can correct for much of the 
WTP bias.  
While CVM respondents have been frequently modeled as Bayesian updaters (Horowitz, 
1993; Herriges and Shogren, 1996; McLeod and Bergland, 1999; Whitehead, 2002; Flores and 
Strong, 2004; and Aadland et al., 2005), updating in a DB-DC CVM is typically restricted to the 
asking of the second bid amount2.  If rational respondents are updating due to the second bid 
amount, we believe it is also reasonable to expect rational respondents to be updating to the first 
bid amount, and we therefore develop a respondent model of Bayesian updating to allow for this.  
Consequently, our model of respondent Bayesian updating behavior may be interpreted as an 
extension of the traditional starting-point bias models where respondents do not update prior to 
responding to the first bid amount.   
                                                 
2
 Aadland et al. (2005) is an exception to this in the DB-DC case, allowing updating on both the first and second bid 
amounts. 
 2 9/6/2006 
Using our respondent model of Bayesian updating behavior, we derive structural shift 
specifications to allow for the identification of respondent true WTP in a DB-DC CVM given 
updating on the second bid amount only, as well updating on both bid amounts.  These 
specifications are comparable to the traditional structural shift model of Alberini et al., (1997) 
which only includes a dummy variable for the asking of the second bid amount   We show that 
even if respondent Bayesian updating is restricted only to occur with the asking of the second bid 
amount, the correct structural shift specification in this context includes an additional term that is 
a function of the second bid amount.  When respondents Bayesian update on both bid amounts, 
we show that the correct structural shift specification in this context includes additional terms 
that are functions of the first and second bid amounts, and true WTP from the correctly specified 
structural shift model is not identifiable. 
 In order to demonstrate the extent of WTP bias in a respondent Bayesian updating 
context for the two identifiable structural shift models (the traditional model with only the 
dummy variable for the asking of the second bid amount, and the model we specify that also 
includes a term that is a function of the 2nd bid amount), we simulate respondents updating on the 
second bid amount only, as well updating on both bid amounts.  Our simulations show that the 
traditional structural shift estimation produces biased estimates of the true WTP when researcher 
and respondent prior beliefs of the true WTP are not congruent, a result that places a heavy 
emphasis on the precision of the survey pre-test and bid selection.  Furthermore, this 
specification consistently produces biased estimates of the standard deviation of WTP.  
Conversely, our simulations show that the incorporation of the term that is a function of the 2nd 
bid amount can correct for much of the WTP bias and standard deviation of WTP bias generated, 
except at high levels of respondent updating.  Moreover, an empirical application of both of the 
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identifiable structural shift models to the Alaska Exxon Valdez DB-DC dataset confirms the 
simulation outcomes, with the key result being that our simple extension of the traditional 
structural shift model is significantly different from zero.                              
 Given the continued use of DB-DC CVMs by researchers and practitioners, as well as the 
persistent notion that respondents are in fact uncertain about their true WTP (see, e.g., Li and 
Mattsson, 1995; Ready et al, 1995; Cameron and Englin, 1997; Wang, 1997; Loomis and 
Ekstrand, 1998; Park, 2003), our results are noteworthy.  Indeed, a practical solution is offered 
that identifies true WTP for uncertain respondents that are rationally acting as Bayesian updaters 
in a DB-DC CVM (certainly for those suspected of only updating on the second bid amount).  
The results also advise caution to the perception that respondents are acting strategically toward 
the asking of the second bid amount (Carson, et al., 2000), or as Aadland et al. (2005) state that, 
“Once one takes this Bayesian perspective of WTP formation, the recent discussion of the 
incentive incompatibility of DB-DC formats changes markedly.”       
 This paper is organized as follows: Section II outlines the respondent Bayesian updating 
model; Section III discusses the identification of true WTP given the Bayesian framework; 
Section IV provides an overview of the data simulation; Section V presents the results of the 
estimation; Section VI applies both of the identifiable structural shift models to the Alaska DB-
DC dataset ; and Section VII provides concluding comments. 
 
II. Respondent Bayesian Updating Model 
 Each of the ith individual DB-DC CVM respondents has WTPi consisting of two 
components 
 i iWTP θ µ= +  [1] 
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where θ is an unknown component that is common to all respondents, and µi is a known, 
idiosyncratic component.  A possible interpretation of [1] is that respondent i knows he values 
the natural resource that is the focus of the CVM by more or less than the average person, by an 
amount µi.  In this interpretation, the expectation over all individuals is simply E(µ) = 0.  
Although respondent i does not know θ, he holds prior beliefs that it is a draw from a normal 
distribution with mean iθ  and variance 2θσ .   
Let bi1 and bi2 denote the first and second bid amounts offered to respondent i as per the 
DB-DC CVM standard protocol.  Given respondent i's WTP uncertainty, he interprets each of 
the j = 1,2 offered bids as a signal of the true value of θ such that he believes 
 ( )ij ij ijb θ α ε= + +  [2] 
where αij is a constant known by individual i, and he assumes that ( )20, ijij N εε σ∼ .  That is, he 
interprets ij ijb α−  as independent and unbiased signals of θ.     
 From [1], respondent i's prior belief of WTPi is that it is normally distributed with mean 
i iθ µ+  and variance 2θσ .  Let WTPij denote E(WTPi) after receiving j offered bids.  Then, 
0i i iWTP θ µ= + .  Using standard Bayesian formulae for normal conjugates3, i's posterior beliefs 
of WTPi after receiving the first bid, bi1, is normal with mean 
       
 ( )
( )
( )1 1 1
2 2
1 1
1 2 2 2 2
i
i i
i i i
i i
b
WTP ε θ
θ ε θ ε
θ σ α σµ
σ σ σ σ
⋅
− ⋅
= + +
+ +
 [3] 
and variance 
                                                 
3
 While other Bayesian updating representations could ostensibly be used, the normal conjugate importantly allows 
for tractable results 
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 ( )11
2 2
2
1 2 2
i
i
i
θ ε
θ ε
σ σ
σ
σ σ
⋅
=
+
 [4] 
Given that the respondent is updating on both bid amounts under the reasonable assumption that 
they interpret both bids as being independent, when receiving the second bid, bi2, [3] and [4] 
become i's prior beliefs such that the posterior beliefs after hearing bi2 are also normal with mean 
 
( )
( )
( )
( )22 2
2 2
1 2 2 1
2 2 2 2 2
1 1
i
i i
i i i i i
i i
i i
WTP b
WTP ε
ε ε
µ σ α σµ
σ σ σ σ
− ⋅
− ⋅
= + +
+ +
 [5] 
and variance 
  
 ( )22
2 2
12
2 2 2
1
i
i
i
i
i
ε
ε
σ σ
σ
σ σ
⋅
=
+
 [6] 
Substituting for ( )1i iWTP µ−  and 21iσ  in [5] and [6] from [3] and [4], [5] and [6] can be rewritten 
such that  
 
( )( )
( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )( )
2 11
1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1
2 2 22 2
1 12 2
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
i ii
i i i i i i i i
i i ii i
i i
bb
WTP
ε θ εθ ε
θ ε ε ε ε θ ε ε ε ε
σ α σ θ σα σ σ
µ
σ σ σ σ σ σ σ σ σ σ
 
− +
− ⋅  
= + +
+ + + +
 [7] 
and  
 ( ) ( )( )1 21 2 2 1
2 2 2
2
2 2 2 2 2 2
i i
i i i i
i
θ ε ε
θ ε ε ε ε
σ σ σ
σ
σ σ σ σ σ
⋅ ⋅
=
+ +
 [8] 
 
Using 0i i iWTP θ µ= + , [3] and [7] can be simplified further to  
 
( )
( )1
2
1 1
1 0 2 2
i
i i i
i i
b
WTP WTP θ
θ ε
α θ σ
σ σ
− − ⋅
= +
+
 [9] 
and 
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( )( )( ) ( )( )( )
( ) ( )( )
1 2
1 2 2 1
2 2 2 2
2 2 1 1
2 0 2 2 2 2 2
i i
i i i i
i i i i i i
i i
b b
WTP WTP θ ε θ ε
θ ε ε ε ε
α θ σ σ α θ σ σ
σ σ σ σ σ
− − + − −
= +
+ +
 [10]  
 
III. Identification of True WTP 
 In conducting a CVM, the goal of the researcher is to obtain the respondent’s prior beliefs 
of WTP, WTPi0.  For example, as Herriges and Shogren (1996, pg. 117) note, “... it is the 
household’s prior held beliefs that the policymaker should be interested in, not the posterior 
WTP estimates that are artificially influenced by an optimal bid design.”  Therefore, we consider 
the ability to identify a respondent’s true WTP, WTPi0, from our Bayesian updating framework 
for the three different possible respondent signaling perspectives of our model: 1) neither bid 
provides a signal; 2) only the 2nd bid provides a signal; or 3) both bids provide a signal.  
 
Neither Bid Provides A Signal 
If respondent i believes that neither of the j = 1,2 offered bids contains a signal, then 
2
ijε
σ → ∞ .  If this is the case, then from [9] and [10], 2 1 0i i iWTP WTP WTP= = .  Therefore, true 
WTP can be identified from the responses to both questions by DB-DC estimation with 
associated efficiency gains over estimation using only responses to the first bid amount 
(Hanemann et al., 1991).     
 
2nd Bid Only Provides A Signal 
If it is the case that respondent i believes that information concerning θ is contained in the 
second bid only, then
1 2
2 2
 and 
i iε ε
σ σ→ ∞ < ∞ .  From  [9] we see that 1 0i iWTP WTP= .  However, 
in this case WTPi2 does not follow from [10], as [3] and [4] no longer represent respondent i's 
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prior beliefs when they receive bi2.  Instead, respondent i has prior beliefs with mean iθ  and 
variance 2θσ  when they receive bi2.  Thus, again using standard Bayesian formulae for normal 
conjugates, i's posterior beliefs of WTPi after receiving bi2 is normal with mean     
 ( )
( )
( )2 2 2
2 2
2 2
2 2 2 2 2
i
i i
i i i
i i
b
WTP ε θ
θ ε θ ε
θ σ α σµ
σ σ σ σ
⋅
− ⋅
= + +
+ +
 [11] 
which, again using 0i i iWTP θ µ= + , can be simplified further to 
 
( )
( )2
2
2 2
2 0 2 2
i
i i i
i i
b
WTP WTP θ
θ ε
α θ σ
σ σ
− − ⋅
= +
+
 [12] 
In this case, it therefore follows from [9] and [12] that 2 1 0i i iWTP WTP WTP≠ = .   Consequently, 
WTP estimates derived from the responses to the first bid are able to provide a consistent 
estimation of true WTP, but estimates derived from responses to both bids will be inconsistent 
unless an adequate control for the second response is introduced.   
Alberini et al.’s (1997) structural shift dummy variable, adapted to our notation, is 
specified as 
 
1 0
2 0
i i i
i i i i
WTP WTP
WTP WTP
η
δ η
= +
= + +
 [13] 
where δi is the coefficient on a structural shift dummy variable that takes on the value one for 
responses to the second question.  However, it is clear from [12] that the correct specification in 
a Bayesian updating context should also include an interaction term between δi and the 
magnitude of bi2 4, that is   
 ( ) ( )
1 0
2 0 2 2
i i i
i i i i i i i i
WTP WTP
WTP WTP b
η
α θ δ δ η
= +
′ ′= − + + +
 [14] 
                                                 
4
 Alberini et al. (1997, pg. 319) note that “δ could also be a function of additional explanatory variables including 
the cost amount or the change in cost amounts.” 
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where ( )22 2 2/ ii θ θ εδ σ σ σ′ = + .  Because i22 22 ,  ,   and i i θ εα θ σ σ  are not observable, 
( )2  and i i i iα θ δ δ′ ′− + are two individual-specific parameters.  Assuming they are common to all 
individuals (Alberini et al., 1997) such that iδ δ′ = , yields the system   
 ( )
1 0
0 1
2 0 2 2 2
i i i
i i i i
WTP WTP
WTP WTP I I b
η
δ δ η
= +
= + + +
 [15] 
where I2 is a dummy variable indicating the asking of the second bid amount.  From [15] we see 
that in a respondent Bayesian updating context, the correct structural shift specification is 
dependent upon the size of the second bid amount.  Therefore, true WTP is able to be identified 
from the responses to both questions with the appropriate dummy variable specification by 
stacking the data and estimating a conventional single-bound model (SB-DC) that has two 
observations for each respondent.      
  
Both Bids Provide A Signal 
Finally, if it is the case that respondent i believes that information concerning θ is 
contained in both bid amounts, then
1 2
2 2
 and 
i iε ε
σ σ< ∞ < ∞ .  If this is the case, from [9] and [10] 
we have 2 1 0i i iWTP WTP WTP≠ ≠ .  Consequently, unbiased estimates of WTP will only be able to 
be derived if an adequate control for both responses is implemented in the estimation.   
Again, adapting Alberini et al.’s (1997) structural shift dummy variable to our notation 
with respondent updating on both bid amounts we have that 
 
1 0 1
2 0 2
i i i i
i i i i
WTP WTP
WTP WTP
δ η
δ η
= + +
= + +
 [16]   
where δi1 is a coefficient on a structural shift dummy variable that takes on the value one for 
responses to the first question, and δi2 is a coefficient on a structural shift dummy variable that 
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takes on the value one for responses to the second question.  Allowing the δi’s to be functions of 
the bid amounts (which naturally follows from our respondent Bayesian updating context as per 
the second term on the right-hand side of both [9] and [10]) [16] can now be specified as  
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 0 1 1 1 1
2 0 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 1
i i i i i i i i
i i i i i i i i i i i i i
WTP WTP b
WTP WTP b b
α θ δ δ η
α θ δ δ α θ δ δ η
′ ′= − + + +
′ ′ ′′ ′′= − + + − + + +
 [17] 
where ( )12 2 21 / ii θ θ εδ σ σ σ′ = + , ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 1 2 2 12 2 2 2 2 2 22 /i i i i ii θ ε θ ε ε ε εδ σ σ σ σ σ σ σ′ = + + , and 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )2 1 2 2 12 2 2 2 2 2 22 /i i i i ii θ ε θ ε ε ε εδ σ σ σ σ σ σ σ′′ = + + .  Assuming the individual-specific 
parameters are common to all individuals, the following system is specified 
 
( )
( ) ( )
0 1
1 0 1 1 1
2 3 4 5
2 0 2 2 2 2 2 1
i i i i
i i i i i
WTP WTP I I b
WTP WTP I I b I I b
δ δ η
δ δ δ δ η
= + +
= + + + + +
 [18] 
There are restrictions on these parameters, for example, if 2 3 4 51 2 , then / /i iα α δ δ δ δ= = .  But 
despite these potential restrictions, it is clear that WTPi0 cannot be identified.   
  
For the three different possible respondent signaling perspectives of our Bayesian 
updating model, we have shown that the identification of true WTP is only possible for two of 
them given that the appropriate WTP estimation model has been specified.  Since in conducting a 
CVM it is the goal of the researcher to obtain the respondent’s true WTP, it is essential to 
understand the extent of bias (and if possible to correct for it) inherent in the estimated WTP if it 
is the case that respondents are updating on both bids and the researcher cannot specify the 
correct WTP estimation model, or where respondents are only updating on the second bid but the 
researcher has specified a WTP estimation model that does not contain the appropriate dummy 
variable specification.           
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IV. Data Simulation 
In order to demonstrate the extent of WTP bias in a respondent Bayesian updating 
context for the two identifiable structural shift models (the traditional model, [13], and our 
extension of this model, [15]), we simulate respondents updating on the second bid amount only, 
as well updating on both bid amounts.  Faced with a randomly selected bid amount, a CVM 
respondent will say yes to bij when WTPij is greater than bij, and no when it is less.  Therefore, in 
a DB-DC CVM when respondents are updating on bi2 only, yes/no responses are generated 
according to: 
 
( )
( )
( )
( )
2
2 2
2 2
2
2
2 2
2 2
2
2 0 2
1 0 1
1 2
1 0 1
2 0 2
1    1   
,   yes
0  0    
i i i
i
i i i
i
b
i i i
i i i
i i b
i i i
i i i
WTP WTP bWTP WTP b
yes
WTP WTP b WTP WTP b
θ
θ ε
θ
θ ε
α θ σ
σ σ
α θ σ
σ σ
− − ⋅
+
− − ⋅
+

= + >
= > 
= = 
= <  = + <

 [19] 
where 0i i iWTP θ µ= + .  And, when respondents are updating on both bi1 and bi2, yes/no responses 
are generated according to: 
 
( )
( )
( )
( )
( )( )( ) ( )( )( )
( ) ( )( )
2
1 1
2 2
1
2
1 1
2 2
1
2 2 2 2
2 2 1 11 2
2 2 2 2 2
1 2 2 1
1 0 1
1
1 0 1
2 0 2
2
1    
,   
0    
1    
      yes
0  
i i i
i
i i i
i
i i i i i ii i
i i i i
b
i i i
i b
i i i
b b
i i i
i
WTP WTP b
yes
WTP WTP b
WTP WTP b
θ
θ ε
θ
θ ε
θ ε θ ε
θ ε ε ε ε
α θ σ
σ σ
α θ σ
σ σ
α θ σ σ α θ σ σ
σ σ σ σ σ
− − ⋅
+
− − ⋅
+
− − + − −
+ +

= + >

= 
 = + <

= + >
= ( )( )( ) ( )( )( )
( ) ( )( )
2 2 2 2
2 2 1 11 2
2 2 2 2 2
1 2 2 1
2 0 2  
i i i i i ii i
i i i i
b b
i i iWTP WTP b
θ ε θ ε
θ ε ε ε ε
α θ σ σ α θ σ σ
σ σ σ σ σ
− − + − −
+ +



 = + <

 [20] 
where 0i i iWTP θ µ= + .   
We specify our values for 2 2, , , , ,  and 
iji i ij ijbθ εθ µ σ α σ  as summarized in Table 1.
5
  For 
each of the eight specified 
1iε
σ  values, per each of the three specified bi1 mean values of Table 1, 
                                                 
5
 Typical CVM initial bids are centered around a single value with specified increments (e.g., 25, 50, 75, 100, 125, 
150, 200).  We have not specified any such increments in drawing our initial bids from a normal distribution.  We do 
not feel this comprises the analysis.   
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we generate 1000 samples each of sample size 1000.  Given the generated sample data, yes/no 
responses follow from [19] and [20].  Figure 1 provides an example of generated DB-DC yes/no 
responses for an illustrative respondent that does not Bayesian update on either bid, updates on 
the second bid only (
2
2 10
iε
σ = ), and updates on both bids (
1 2
2 210,  and 10
i iε ε
σ σ= = ).     
 
V. Estimation and Results 
In addition to the generated DB-DC yes/no responses and associated bid amounts from 
the data simulation, an intercept (the only independent variable used in order to represent WTPi) 
and the appropriate bi2 dummy variable(s) from [13] and [15] complete the datasets to be 
estimated.  The introduction of the structural shift dummy variable(s) requires the data to be 
stacked, and therefore maximum likelihood estimation of WTP follows from the conventional 
SB-DC model of Cameron and James (1987), but with two observations for each respondent.  
We perform probit and logit maximum likelihood estimation for the 1000 samples for each 
specification.  Because probit and logit simulations are qualitatively similar, only logit estimation 
results are presented below.        
 
Structural Shift Model with only the Dummy Variable for the Asking of the Second Bid 
 Figures 2(a) and 2(b) illustrate the results from  [13] for the estimated mean WTP and 
standard deviation of WTP respectively, when the initial bid value is drawn from a normal 
distribution that is centered on the true WTP of 100, and the respondents are updating on both 
bid amounts.  Estimates of the 97.5 and 2.5 percentiles of mean WTP and standard deviation of 
WTP are also illustrated in Figures 2(a) and 2(b) respectively as a measure of the variability of 
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these estimates across the eight specified 
1iε
σ  values6.  Furthermore, although the results 
presented are based upon the simulated responses to both bid amounts, for high levels of 
1iε
σ  
(denoted sig eps_1 in the figures) along the x-axis, the results can be interpreted as respondents 
updating only on the second bid amount.  In this way, the figures simultaneously present the 
results for the estimated mean WTP, standard deviation of WTP, and the associated 97.5 and 2.5 
percentiles in both of the respondent Bayesian updating contexts.7   
While Figure 2(a) shows that the results of estimated mean WTP are unbiased8 vs. the 
true value of 100, Figure 2(b) indicates that the estimated standard deviation of WTP is biased 
upward vs. the true value of 20 for all levels of 
1iε
σ .  These general bias results hold whether the 
respondent is updating on either both bid amounts, or only the second bid amount.  However, the 
upward bias of the standard deviation of WTP becomes larger as less updating is occurring on 
the first bid amount.  Additionally, while the variability of the estimates of mean WTP remains 
relatively constant over the specified levels of 
1iε
σ , the variability of the estimates of standard 
deviation of WTP increases with higher levels of 
1iε
σ (i.e., with less updating on the first bid 
amount).  Therefore, in the case where researchers select initial bid amounts from a distribution 
that is centered on respondent’s prior beliefs of true WTP = 100, unbiased estimates of mean 
WTP with relatively constant variability are generated, although the standard deviation of the 
these estimates is biased upward with both the bias and the variability of the standard deviation 
estimates increasing as respondents update less on the first bid amount.     
                                                 
6
 Results for 
1iε
σ = 1000 are not shown for aesthetic purposes, but are approximate to the results for 
1iε
σ = 100.  
7
 This is true for all of the other estimation figures associated with this model, namely Figures 3(a) and 3(b) 
8
 T-tests at the 1% level are used to confirm the presence of bias for all estimation results of mean WTP and 
standard deviation of WTP unless otherwise noted. 
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But what about the case where researchers prior beliefs of true WTP do not match to 
those of respondents, a case that seems to be more likely to occur in the implementation of a 
CVM?  Figures 3(a) and 3(b) illustrate the results from  [13] for the estimated mean WTP and 
standard deviation of WTP respectively when the initial bid value is drawn from a normal 
distribution that is not centered on the true WTP, i.e., 50 < 100, and the respondents are updating 
on both bid amounts9.  In this case, both the estimates of the mean WTP and the standard 
deviation of WTP are biased when respondents are updating on both bid amounts, and also when 
respondents are updating only on the second bid amount.  From Figure 3(a) we see that for 
strong updating on both bid amounts (low levels of 
1iε
σ ), mean WTP is biased downward from 
true WTP = 100 with little variability in the estimates.  In fact, for complete updating on the first 
bid amount (
1iε
σ =0), estimated WTP is the mean of the bid distribution = 50.  However, with 
less updating on the first bid amount, estimated mean WTP is biased upward from true WTP = 
100 and contains more variability in the estimates.  Estimated standard deviation of WTP is 
again biased upward vs. the true value of 20 for all levels of 
1iε
σ , but in this case the upward bias 
and variability of the standard deviation estimates are more constant over the specified levels of 
1iε
σ .     
To better understand the source of the bias, Table 2 illustrates the shifts in the 
percentages of Yes-Yes, Yes-No, No-Yes, and No-No responses between respondents not 
updating on either bid, and those updating on both bids when 
1iε
σ =2 and 
2iε
σ =10.  When 
respondents do not update on either bid presented to them, and given that the presented initial bid 
value is drawn from a normal distribution that is not centered on the true WTP, i.e., 50 < 100, 
                                                 
9
 The opposite mean WTP graph is produced when the initial bid value is drawn from a normal distribution with 
mean exceeding the true WTP, i.e., 150 > 100  
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more than 90% of the DB-DC responses fall into either the Yes-Yes or Yes-No vote categories 
as would be expected.  Due to the high levels of Yes votes in this non-updating scenario, 
responses primarily fall into bounded intervals only above the initial bid amount = 50, and 
estimated mean WTP is able to move to the true WTP = 100.  However, when respondents are 
updating (relatively strongly) on both bid amounts, there is a remarkable decrease in Yes-Yes 
votes and corresponding increase in No-Yes and No-No votes.  As can be inferred from the 
Bayesian updating example of Figure 1, for strong enough updating as well as relatively close 
true WTP and initial bid amounts, initial yes responses in a non-updating context are easily 
reversed.  Therefore, responses no longer primarily fall into bounded intervals only above the 
initial bid amount = 50, and estimated mean WTP is not able to approach true WTP = 100.   
These overall estimation results for the traditional structural shift model indicate that, in a 
respondent Bayesian updating context, this model fails to generate unbiased estimates of mean 
WTP unless the initial bid amount is centered on respondent’s prior beliefs.  Unfortunately, 
achieving initial bid amounts that are centered on respondent’s prior beliefs is a case that would 
appear to be seemingly rare in practice, or at the very least places a heavy burden on the typical 
CVM pre-test.  That is, it is reasonable to assume that pre-test respondents would also be 
Bayesian updating, and therefore results from a pre-test would not provide any further insight 
into how to adjust the bid amounts to be centered on respondent’s prior beliefs of what is true 
WTP.  Moreover, these overall estimation results for the traditional structural shift model 
indicate that, in a respondent Bayesian updating context, this model always fails to generate 
unbiased estimates of the standard deviation of WTP.       
 
Structural Shift Model that also Includes a Term that is a Function of the Second Bid 
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Figures 4(a) and 4(b) illustrate the results from  [15] for the estimated mean WTP and 
standard deviation of WTP respectively when the initial bid value is drawn from a normal 
distribution that is centered on the true WTP of 100, and the respondents are updating on both 
bid amounts.  Estimates of the 97.5 and 2.5 percentiles of mean WTP and standard deviation of 
WTP are also illustrated in Figures 4(a) and 4(b) respectively as a measure of the variability of 
these estimates across the eight specified 
1iε
σ  values10.  Furthermore, although the results 
presented are based upon the simulated responses to both bid amounts, for high levels of 
1iε
σ  
(denoted sig eps_1 in the figures) along the x-axis, the results can be interpreted as respondents 
updating only on the second bid amount.  In this way, the figures simultaneously present the 
results for the estimated mean WTP, standard deviation of WTP, and the associated 97.5 and 2.5 
percentiles in both of the respondent Bayesian updating contexts.11     
While Figure 4(a) shows that the results of estimated mean WTP are still unbiased vs. the 
true value of 100, Figure 4(b) indicates that the previous bias in the standard deviation of WTP = 
20 from the traditional structural shift model of Figure 2(b) has dissipated.  Furthermore, the 
variability of both the estimated mean WTP and standard deviation of WTP has decreased 
significantly as evidenced by the tighter 97.5 and 2.5 percentile lines.  However, we do start to 
see evidence of increased variability of mean WTP estimates, as well as evidence of bias and 
increased variability of estimates for the standard deviation of WTP for high levels of updating 
on bid 1 (low levels of 
1iε
σ )12.  These results at the least therefore indicate that this specification 
does a better job then the traditional structural shift model in producing unbiased estimates of the 
                                                 
10
 Results for 
1iε
σ = 1000 are not shown for aesthetic purposes, but are approximate to the results for 
1iε
σ = 100.  
11
 This is true for all of the other estimation figures associated with this model, namely Figures 5(a) and 5(b) 
12
 Convergence issues at these low levels (i.e., 
1iε
σ < 10) prevent us at this time from making a more definitive 
statement concerning bias and depicting the results graphically.   
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standard deviation of WTP when it is believed that respondents update only on the second bid 
amount.   
    Figures 5(a) and 5(b) illustrate results from [15] for the estimated mean WTP and 
standard deviation of WTP respectively when the initial bid value is drawn from a normal 
distribution that is not centered on the true WTP, i.e., 50 < 100, and the respondents are updating 
on both bid amounts.  Contrasting Figures 5(a) and 5(b) with Figures 3(a) and 3(b) we clearly see 
the improvement in reduced bias over the traditional structural shift model for both the estimates 
of mean WTP and the standard deviation of WTP.  We also see improvements in the variability 
of both the estimated mean WTP and standard deviation of WTP as evidenced by the tighter 97.5 
and 2.5 percentile lines.  We again, however, start to see evidence of increased variability of 
mean WTP estimates, as well as evidence of bias and increased variability of estimates for the 
standard deviation of WTP for high levels of updating on bid 1 (low levels of 
1iε
σ )13.        
These overall estimation results for the structural shift model we specify that also 
includes a term that is a function of the 2nd bid amount indicate that in a respondent Bayesian 
updating context, unbiased and less variable estimates of mean WTP and standard deviation of 
WTP can be generated.  The results certainly hold well for the case where respondents are only 
updating on the second bid amount as is typically perceived in the DB-DC CVM literature.  For 
the case where respondents are updating on both bids, even though there is some indication of 
bias for high levels of updating on bid 1, obvious improvement over the traditional structural 
shift model in terms of reduced bias estimates of mean WTP and standard deviation of WTP is 
demonstrated.    
 
                                                 
13
 Convergence issues at these low levels (i.e., 
1iε
σ < 10) prevent us at this time from making a more definitive 
statement concerning bias and depicting the results graphically.   
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Investigating Respondent Strategic Behavior 
DB-DC WTP bias from a structural shift model is typically indicated as being downward 
due to the estimated negative δ coefficient (Alberini et al., 1997; Whitehead, 2002).  
Furthermore, Carson et al. (2000) have discussed various strategic behavior theories as to how 
agents may interpret this second price signal in order to explain the WTP downward bias.  We 
show, in fact that it is the asymmetry induced by the standard DB-DC CVM protocol of halving 
bi1 for an initial no response, and doubling bi1 for an initial yes response that generates the 
negative δ coefficient in a respondent Bayesian updating context, not necessarily respondent 
strategic behavior.   
Table 3 presents results from two different estimations of  [13] when the initial bid value 
is drawn from a normal distribution that is centered on the true WTP of 100, and the respondents 
are updating on both bid amounts with 
1 2
2 225,  and 10
i iε ε
σ σ= = .  In the first estimation, bi2 is 
generated by halving bi1 for an initial no response, and doubling bi1 for an initial yes response 
(the standard DB-DC CVM protocol).  In the second estimation, bi2 is generated as (bi1 – 60) for 
an initial no response, and (bi1 + 60) for an initial yes response.  We do generate a (-) δ 
coefficient in the standard halving/doubling bi2 generation, but the (-) δ coefficient disappears in 
our [bi1 (+)/(–) 60] estimation.  Clearly, respondent strategic behavior cannot be inferred simply 
from the generation of a (-) δ coefficient for a DB-DC CVM where bi2 is generated by halving bi1 
for an initial no response, and doubling bi1 for an initial yes response and respondents are acting 
as Bayesian updaters.       
 Our simulation results already presented in Figures 2(a) – 5(b) have all assumed the 
respondent’s known constant of the signal, ijα , from  [2] to equal 0.  If believing that 
respondents are in fact acting strategically similarly to one of the Carson et al. (2000) strategic 
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behavior theories, allowing ijα  ≠ 0 allows for investigation of bias in this strategic behavior 
context.  For example, if respondents feel that the researcher has placed them into a bargaining 
situation they will feel that the bij presented to them has been purposefully inflated.  In this case, 
ijα  < 0 in order to counteract the perceived bid inflation.   
 Figures 6(a) – 7(b) present mean WTP simulation results14 with ijα  = -20 for both 
structural shift identifications of [13] and [15], as well as where bi1 = true WTP = 100 and where 
bi1 = 50 < true WTP = 100.  In this strategic behavior context, we now see upward bias being 
generated for the case where researcher priors are compatible with respondent priors of true 
WTP =100 as shown by Figure 6(a).  The structural shift specification including the term for bi2 
still appears to be able to correct for the generated bias as shown by Figure 7(a), although not at 
as low of levels of 
1iε
σ  as when ijα  = 0.  These results indicate that the specification of  [15] is 
even more important in a possible strategic behavior Bayesian updating context.                
 
VI. Empirical Application 
 Carson et al. (1992) conducted a DB-DC CVM for the State of Alaska in order to obtain a 
WTP value “to prevent another Exxon Valdez type oil spill”.  Median WTP = $31 was estimated 
from respondents’ answers to both CVM questions using an interval DB-DC model assuming a 
Weibull distribution.  As a check on the sensitivity of the estimated DB-DC median WTP value, 
median WTP = $41 was also estimated from answers to the first question only using a SB-DC 
model assuming a log-normal distribution.  Given the disparity between the SB-DC and DB-DC 
WTP estimates, they conclude that a slight downward bias exists between respondents’ answers 
to only the first bid amount and answers to both bid amounts.  Indeed, Carson et al. (2003) note 
                                                 
14
 Standard deviation of WTP graphical results are not presented, but are still biased as was the case where ijα  = 0. 
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that the structural shift model of Alberini et al. (1997) could be used to account for this 
downward bias.  We therefore use the Alaska dataset to estimate WTP from the two identifiable 
structural shift models of this paper (the traditional model, [13], and our extension of this model, 
[15]). 
Table 4 presents the maximum likelihood estimates following from the conventional SB-
DC model of Cameron and James (1987) using the Alaska study responses to the first bid amount 
only.  Additionally, Table 4 presents the maximum likelihood estimates for the two identifiable 
structural shift models of [13] and [15] using the Alaska study responses to both bid amounts 
with the data being stacked to account for the introduction of the structural shift dummy 
variable(s).  Only an intercept and the appropriate bi2 dummy variable(s) from [13] and [15] are 
used in the estimation, and a log-normal distribution has been assumed in order to follow the 
results of Carson et al. (1992).     
 Our SB-DC estimation produces an estimate of 3.73 for the intercept, equating to a 
median WTP15 = $41.58, with the standard deviation of WTP estimated at 3.15.  This WTP 
result closely mirrors the median WTP = $41.44 of Carson et al. (1992).  The traditional 
structural shift model of [13] produces an estimate of 4.18 for the intercept, equating to median 
WTP = $65.54, and 19.73 for the standard deviation of WTP.  Also, although a negative 
coefficient is generated for the 2nd question dummy variable, it is significant only up to the 10% 
level.  The structural shift model of [15] that we specify that also includes a term that is a 
function of the 2nd bid amount produces an estimate of 3.83 for the intercept, equating to median 
WTP = $46.14, and 7.01 for the standard deviation of WTP.  Importantly, the additional term 
that is a function of the 2nd bid amount is significant at the 1% level.   A standard likelihood ratio 
test between [13] and [15] indicates that [15] in fact fits the Alaska data better.   
                                                 
15
 Given the log-normal distribution, median WTP = exp(βx’) with βx’ being the intercept.  
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 This empirical application demonstrates, similar to our simulations, that if one believes 
respondents are only updating on the second bid amount and hence true WTP is represented by 
SB-DC estimates, than the structural shift model of [15] does a better job of estimating a less 
biased true WTP when utilizing a DB-DC CVM approach compared to the traditional structural 
shift model of [13].  Of course, if respondents are updating on both bid amounts, true WTP may 
not be identifiable as has been shown.     
 
VII. Conclusions 
  We have shown why existing structural shift models used to estimate unbiased WTP 
from a DB-DC CVM are theoretically incapable of doing so in a Bayesian updating context due 
to misspecification and identification issues.  Through our data simulations we have 
demonstrated the extent of the WTP bias when the identifiable, yet misspecified structural shift 
model is used.  The results are most serious when researcher and respondent prior beliefs of true 
WTP are not congruent.  We suggest a more properly specified structural shift model following 
from the respondent Bayesian updating behavioral model that includes an additional term that is 
a function of the second bid amount.  Our data simulations show that this specification can 
correct for much of the potential WTP bias.  An empirical application to the Alaska Exxon 
Valdez DB-DC dataset confirms the simulation outcomes, with the key result being that our 
simple extension of the traditional structural shift model is significantly different from zero. 
The results of the paper also offer an alternative to the perception that respondents act 
strategically in a DB-DC CVM, and that their responses are not incentive compatible between 
questions.  Rather, uncertain respondents act rationally by incorporating information signaled to 
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them through both of the presented bid amounts.  Not accounting for this possibility in the 
structural shift estimation leads to biased estimates of the respondent’s true WTP.              
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Table 1. Specified Values for 2 2, , , , ,  and 
iji i ij ijbθ εθ µ σ α σ  Used In the Data Simulation 
Category Variable SpecifiedValue 
iθ  100  i∀  
WTPi0 
iµ  ~N(0,σ) and σ=20 
Standard Deviation 
of Prior Beliefs θσ  20  
Signal known 
constant ij
α
 
0  
1iε
σ  1000, 100, 50, 25, 10, 5, 2, 0 Strength of 
Updating 
2iε
σ  10 
bi1 ~N(100,σ), ~N(50,σ), ~N(150,σ) and σ=30 
Bids 
bi2 (bi1)*2, or (bi1)*1/2 for yes or no to bi1 respectively 
 
 23 9/6/2006 
Table 2. % of YY, YN, NY, NN Responses for 2 0 2 2i i iWTP WTP Iδ η= + +   
 
 
DB-DC  
Response 
No 
Updating 
Updating on  
Both Bids 
YY 50% 8% 
YN 42% 43% 
NY 8% 34% 
NN 0% 15% 
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Table 3.  δ Coefficient Results For Halving/Doubling, And (+)/(-) 60 bi2 Generation 
 
 
 
Estimates 
halving/doubling 
Estimates 
(+)/(-) 60 
WTP 100.1 100.0 
δ -18.9 0.2 
σ 93.7 135.3 
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Table 4: Alaska Study Maximum Likelihood Estimates 
 
Parameter SB-DC 
Traditional 
Structural Shift 
Structural Shift 
with Bid 
Interaction 
    
intercept 3.7276 (29.91) 
4.1827 
(5.064) 
3.8316 
(13.784) 
    
δ
0 
 
-7.7975 
(-1.723) 
-4.1345 
(-4.232) 
    
δ
1
   
0.0216 
(4.606) 
    
σ 
3.1493 
(7.293) 
19.7323 
(1.785) 
7.0067 
(3.886) 
    
    
log L -695.52 -1400.00 -1392.07 
n 1043 2086 2086 
 
  Note: t-statistics are in parenthesis 
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Figure 1.  An Example of Generated Yes/No Responses Based Upon No Bayesian Updating, 
Updating on the Second Bid Only, and Updating on Both Bids for a Single Respondent 
 
 
 
 
 
Yes/No Results:          Bid 1
            
Bid 2 
Non-Bayes     1      1 
Bayes (both)      1       0 
Bayes (2nd)       1      0 
 
Non-Bayes 
96 > 46 
Yes 
Bayes (both bids) 
WTPi1 = 54 > 46 
Yes 
Bayes (2nd bid) 
WTPi1 = 96 > 46 
Yes 
WTPi0 = 96, bi1 = 46 
bi2 = (46)*(2) = 92 
Bayes (2nd bid) 
WTPi2 = 91 < 92 
No 
Bayes (both bids) 
WTPi2 = 70 < 92 
No 
Non-Bayes 
96 > 92 
Yes 
 27 9/6/2006 
Figure 2. Simulation results for 2 0 2 2i i iWTP WTP Iδ η= + + , where E(bi1)=E(WTPi0)=100. 
(a) Mean WTP, (b) Standard Deviation of WTP 
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Figure 3. Simulation results for 2 0 2 2i i iWTP WTP Iδ η= + + , where E(bi1)=50 < E(WTPi0)=100  
(a) Mean WTP, (b) Standard Deviation of WTP  
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Figure 4. Simulation results for ( )0 12 0 2 2 2 2i i i iWTP WTP I I bδ δ η= + + + , E(bi1)=E(WTPi0)=100.   
(a) Mean WTP, (b) Standard Deviation of WTP 
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Figure 5. Simulation results for ( )0 12 0 2 2 2 2i i i iWTP WTP I I bδ δ η= + + + , where E(bi1)=50 < 
E(WTPi0)=100. (a) Mean WTP, (b) Standard Deviation of WTP 
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Figure 6. Mean WTP Simulation results for 2 0 2 2i i iWTP WTP Iδ η= + + , and ijα  = - 20 . 
(a) E(bi1)=E(WTPi0)=100 , (b) E(bi1)=50 < E(WTPi0)=100 
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Figure 7. Mean WTP Simulation results for ( )0 12 0 2 2 2 2i i i iWTP WTP I I bδ δ η= + + + , and ijα  = - 20 
(a) E(bi1)=E(WTPi0)=100 , (b) E(bi1)=50 < E(WTPi0)=100 
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